Today, we’re discussing transfer pricing, trust and the fight over the margin pool.
Transfer pricing is not just a tax topic. It is how asset-backed commodity businesses decide who created value, who bore the risk and who gets paid from the shared margin pool.
Get it wrong, and it can distort bonuses, capital allocation, hedging decisions and even trust. Get it right, and it can unlock how enterprises use their commercial organisations to make better decisions across the business.
Joining us to discuss transfer pricing are three returning guests: Savas Manoussos, a former senior executive in bp’s trading organisation who built and ran Maersk Oil’s trading capability; Jan Petter Onstvedt, a senior risk and finance executive whose previous roles include Managing Director at Citigroup; and Anne Devlin, a 22-year veteran of bp’s trading business, where she ran several books, including crude.
All three are advisors at Enco Insights, supporting organisations through short- and long-term engagements on the complex commercial and organisational issues explored in this episode.
Podcast Briefing: an Edited Q&A
The following Q&A has been adapted from the HC Commodities Podcast and edited for clarity and length.
Transfer pricing is about more than tax
Paul Chapman: When most people hear “transfer pricing”, they think about tax and accounting. Why is that too narrow a lens?
Savas Manoussos: Most people still regard transfer pricing as a tax and governance exercise, used to explain the business externally and internally. What businesses often miss is that it also describes value to itself.
It influences which parts of the organisation appear profitable, who receives budget allocations, who gains credibility and how bonuses are determined. In extreme cases, it can affect which assets appear worth investing in. There is a tax and compliance dimension, but stopping there means missing the real operating consequences for the enterprise.
Understanding where value is created
Paul Chapman: From a trading perspective, is it fair to say that transfer pricing has profound implications for how value is understood?
Anne Devlin: It is really about understanding where value comes from and how it has been created. Traders do more than put a price on what the assets have produced.
In a well-run trading organisation, trading adds market intelligence and optimises timing, logistics and customer reach. Trouble begins when an organisation overstates or understates that contribution, then rewards people as though one side alone created the value.
Challenging simplistic views of the organisation
Paul Chapman: When a board begins discussing transfer pricing properly, what does it start to reveal about the organisation?
Jan Petter Onstvedt: Most people have an overly simplistic view of at least part of an organisation. Traders may be seen as simply executing orders at a screen price. An asset may be viewed as something that takes raw materials in and produces finished materials at a fixed cost.
Those views are far too simplistic. When you begin debating transfer pricing, that becomes obvious. There is enormous value in developing a more refined understanding of the organisation and where value actually comes from.
Volatility makes profit harder to explain
Paul Chapman: We have seen considerable swings in trading profitability over recent years. Why does that make the transfer-pricing architecture so important?
Jan Petter Onstvedt: Volatility tends to benefit trading businesses, but not always. Explaining where profit comes from becomes harder because it is easy to say that trading rooms profit from volatility without considering the risk taken or how the organisation managed it.
The relationship between risk, trading profits and market conditions needs to be understood. Organisations often try to normalise performance by comparing it with an average or a supposedly normal market. But after several years of rapid changes in market conditions and the geopolitical environment, defining “normal” has become much harder.
Why problems surface when margins tighten
Paul Chapman: Is transfer pricing more challenging during highly profitable years or when trading margins come under pressure?
Savas Manoussos: Both environments matter. When everyone is making substantial profits and margins are extraordinary, there may be little tension. Organisations flatter themselves, assume the model is working and overlook opportunities or weaknesses.
The problem becomes more visible when margins normalise. People are then forced to ask how much of the performance represented genuine enterprise value and how much was simply captured from another internal silo because of the transfer-pricing model.
Leadership must prevent the internal market from becoming a battle over individual credit. The system should help people make better decisions for the enterprise as a whole. That objective is rarely designed clearly enough into operating models.
In a commodity business, weak benchmarks are not simply a pricing error. They are a governance failure dressed up as market logic.
The scale of a small pricing error
Paul Chapman: Can you illustrate how a transfer price works in an oil business and why relatively small inaccuracies matter?
Savas Manoussos: Consider a system processing 500,000 barrels a day in a world where crude is priced at $70 per barrel. If trading executes all feedstock purchases, while 35% of the products are exported and 65% are sold into the domestic market, the business could handle around $26 billion a year across its purchases and sales.
For every ten cents per barrel by which the transfer price is inaccurate or unrepresentative, approximately $36 million of annual profit or EBITDA may be overstated in one part of the organisation and understated elsewhere.
The difficulty is establishing a fair price when only a limited number of crude grades trade openly against liquid benchmarks such as Brent, WTI and Dubai. It becomes even more complicated when the business is blending non-standard products, handling biofuels or trading emissions allowances around those physical flows.
A poor transfer price does not simply move margin. It determines who receives credit for creating that margin. In a commodity business, weak benchmarks are not merely a pricing error. They can become a governance failure dressed up as market logic.
Translating operational complexity into value
Paul Chapman: What does the trading organisation contribute beyond straightforward price discovery?
Anne Devlin: A trader’s understanding of an asset’s operational flexibility can help maximise the value extracted from the market. Put simply, the trader translates complexity into money.
That value can come from quality differences, timing windows, freight optimisation, blending economics, credit exposure, inventory management and arbitrage opportunities. However, the asset must also be operated efficiently enough to provide the flexibility that creates those opportunities.
Discipline is required to recognise both contributions. The asset creates the optionality, while the trader identifies and monetises it.
Connecting asset investment with trading performance
Paul Chapman: How should organisations think about the relationship between asset investment and the profitability attributed to trading?
Jan Petter Onstvedt: Operational flexibility is something traders can monetise, but creating that optionality within an asset-heavy business requires capital expenditure and long-term investment.
That creates a difficult relationship. The asset needs investment to generate more flexibility, but the resulting profitability may appear within the trading or commercial optimisation business. The more optionality the asset creates, the more profitability can appear skewed toward trading, even though the capital has been invested on the asset side.
The organisation therefore needs to resolve this in both the short and long term. In the short term, bonuses and incentives must reflect how value was created. Over the longer term, capital must continue to be invested in the right parts of the enterprise.
Benchmarks are only approximations of reality
Paul Chapman: How accurately can market benchmarks represent what happens in physical crude trading?
Anne Devlin: Benchmarks are highly specific. Each refers to a defined quality, at a defined location and under particular timing or delivery conventions. Physical crude flows do not work quite so neatly.
For example, a Mediterranean refiner taking a cargo of CPC crude may price it at a differential to Dated Brent. However, the refinery’s genuine alternative is not simply another cargo of Dated Brent. CPC delivered into Augusta includes a freight component, while Dated Brent is generally priced on an FOB basis. The qualities and the refinery’s available alternatives are also different.
A benchmark can provide the basis for a formula, but the formula must reflect the much more complex commercial choices available to the refinery.
Trading leaders need the maturity to recognise when a result looks good locally but isn't good for the organisation as a whole.
When incentives distort performance
Paul Chapman: How real is the risk that transfer-pricing structures encourage traders to optimise their own P&L rather than enterprise value?
Anne Devlin: Trading management needs to understand how the money has been made. Traders are good at optimising metrics. That is one of the skills they were recruited for.
If they are measured primarily on desk P&L, or if an internal benchmark allows optionality to be monetised without explicitly recognising where that optionality originated, traders will operate within those boundaries. That is a consequence of the organisation’s design.
Constructive challenge is needed to establish how the profit was created. Trading leaders need the maturity to recognise when a result looks good locally but is not positive for the enterprise as a whole. Traders also need the intellectual honesty to recognise the value of embedded optionality. Trading houses that were historically asset-light have acquired assets because they provide flows and create opportunities to trade around.
Tax should not dictate the commercial strategy
Paul Chapman: How important should tax be when an organisation designs its transfer-pricing approach?
Jan Petter Onstvedt: Companies do not have complete freedom because transfer pricing is governed by tax laws across different jurisdictions. Those laws establish boundaries around what is acceptable when setting prices between legal entities.
Within those boundaries, companies must decide how much emphasis to place on tax efficiency relative to commercial performance, transparency and compensation. The complexity makes it tempting to leave the issue entirely to tax specialists, but that can put the cart before the horse. An organisation should not allow its tax strategy to determine its commercial strategy by default.
At the same time, tax cannot simply be separated from the operating model. In some circumstances, different structural choices could produce a 10% or 20% difference in reported EBITDA. That is significant enough to influence the organisation's fundamental design, even if it is not the only consideration.
What good transfer pricing looks like
Paul Chapman: What should leaders look for in an effective transfer-pricing framework, and what warning signs suggest the organisation has a problem?
Savas Manoussos: At board level, transfer pricing should no longer be treated as a narrow technical policy or tax question. It is part of the company’s governance of its internal market. If it is governed badly, the organisation can misread performance, misallocate capital and ultimately make poorer strategic choices.
Value is more layered than a binary transfer price suggests. Ownership, flexibility, timing, risk capacity, customer access, credit, operational performance and execution all contribute. A framework that recognises only the price will distort decision-making and encourage suboptimal behaviour.
A key warning sign is when transfer pricing causes people to ask, “Who gets the credit?” rather than, “What cooperation and behaviour are we trying to encourage?” Another is when internal teams begin behaving like counterparties instead of members of the same enterprise. At that point, cooperation has become negotiation.
Transfer pricing must therefore be treated as a core element of the operating model. It should be jointly developed rather than imposed, linked directly to the business strategy and periodically pressure-tested, particularly during volatile markets. Its purpose is to improve enterprise decisions, not simply to produce neat and defensible internal invoices.
You do not want your tax strategy to drive the commercial strategy of the organisation.
HC Group is a global search firm dedicated to the energy and commodities markets.
Learn more about our Liquid Fuels & Chemicals Talent Practice
Explore the full HC Commodities Podcast archive